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INTRODUCTION 
In many industries, women are less likely than men to be hired,1 
and research suggests that this is due to subconscious gender bias rather 
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 1. See, e.g., Gregory Ferenstein, Study: Men and Women Twice as Likely to Hire a Man for a 
Math-Based Job, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/13/study-men-and-
women-twice-as-likely-to-hire-a-man-for-a-math-based-job (“We find that without any information 
other than a candidate’s appearance (which makes sex clear), both male and female subjects are 
twice more likely to hire a man than a woman.”); Jonathan Rodkin & Natalie Kitroeff, Women 
Graduating in Business Get Fewer Job Offers Than Men, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 28, 2014, 
2:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-28/women-graduating-from-business-
school-get-fewer-job-offers-than-men (listing fields in which women are less likely than men to be 
hired out of college, including investment banking, health care, real estate, government, nonprofits, 
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than meritorious difference.2 To combat this bias, some orchestras use 
gender-blind auditions to hire their musicians.3 Orchestral hopefuls sit 
behind a screen to play their pieces, and directors listen to determine 
whom they want to hire.4 Some orchestras require applicants to remove 
their shoes before walking onstage, as even the perceived sound of high 
heels can affect a director’s decision.5 Before instituting gender-blind 
auditions, the top five American orchestras had fewer than five percent 
women players.6 But once such procedures were put in place, the per-
centage of women musicians jumped to twenty-five to thirty percent.7 
The difference between blind and non-blind auditions is not an ab-
erration. In one example, a Swedish study removed identifying features 
from job applications before presenting them to participating employers.8 
Researchers hypothesized that anonomyzing job applications would re-
sult in more equal numbers of men and women hired.9 They based this 
hypothesis on recent research showing that “gender [is] used as [a] 
screening tool[] in the selection [of candidates for] job interviews, de-
spite [Swedish] anti-discrimination legislation . . . .”10 Ultimately, they 
concluded: 
From our analysis of all information available to the recruiting 
managers in a data set covering 3,500 applications to more than 100 
jobs, we show that employers select interviewees based on gender 
and ethnicity, which confirms results from previous research. We 
find no corresponding differences between the groups, however, 
when anonymous procedures are used. Our analysis suggests that 
[anonymous application procedures] ha[ve] a statistically signifi-
cant, and large, policy impact in terms of interview offers. Our 
                                                                                                                       
advertising, and media); Aldo Svaldi, Men Winning More Jobs than Women in Economic Recovery, 
DENVER POST (Aug. 5, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21232645/men-winning-
more-jobs-than-women-recovery (“Men have snagged about three of every four of the 2.4 million 
net new jobs created since the summer of 2009 . . . .”). 
 2. See CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND 
NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE 54–66 (2010). 
 3. Curt Rice, What the World’s Best Orchestras Can Teach Us About Gender Discrimination, 
CURT RICE (Oct. 1, 2013), http://curt-rice.com/2013/10/01/what-the-worlds-best-orchestras-can-
teach-us-about-gender-discrimination/. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Olof Åslund & Oskar Nordström Skans, Do Anonymous Job Application Procedures Level 
the Playing Field?, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 82, 82 (2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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study thus adds to the evidence suggesting that anti-discrimination 
legislation is not sufficient to prevent discrimination.11 
Similarly, American law does not adequately protect against em-
ployment discrimination. In discrimination cases, plaintiffs face a very 
high burden, making claims difficult to win.12 This is especially true 
when it comes to subconscious bias. In this Note, I argue that federal leg-
islation is necessary to remedy the effects of subconscious bias by man-
dating that employers remove all sex and gender markers from job appli-
cation materials in the preinterview stage of hiring. I will draft a model 
statute aiming to remove one aspect of gender bias in the hiring process 
as a step toward gender equality. In Part I, I explain how gender is a so-
cial construct by examining sociological data and evaluating neurological 
studies that claim to establish the existence of inherent behavioral differ-
ences between the sexes. Using this information, I argue that subcon-
scious gender bias is problematic in the context of workplace equality. In 
Part II, I evaluate the current state of anti-discrimination law, showing 
how subconscious bias claims are nearly impossible to win. Then, in Part 
III, I propose and draft federal legislation that would require employers 
to remove gender markers from preinterview application materials in an 
attempt to stymie subconscious gender bias. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF SUBCONSCIOUS GENDER BIAS 
In her book, Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and 
Neurosexism Create Difference, Cordelia Fine of the University of Mel-
bourne examines the roots of the idea that men and women are inherently 
different.13 Essentially, she argues that social scientific evidence strongly 
suggests that gender is a social construct rather than a result of sexual 
differences.14 Fine scrutinized scores of neurological studies, social sci-
ence reports, and cultural anecdotes to determine whether there exists 
sufficient scientific basis for gendered behavior as a result of sex differ-
ences.15 She ultimately concluded that perceived sex differences are the 
result of shoddy scientific studies and cultural associations rather than 
inherent neurological differences.16 In this Note, I use Fine’s research as 
a foundation upon which to examine how subconscious bias applies to 
women and gender minorities in the employment context. 
                                                     
 11. Id. at 99. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See generally FINE, supra note 2. 
 14. See id. at 207–13. 
 15. See generally id. 
 16. Id. at 231–39. 
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A. Conflating Gender and Sex 
Gender cues, or characteristics typically indicating gender, are ines-
capable; they pervade every aspect of life from cradle to grave.17 From 
infancy, children are fed cues about their sex and why it is relevant, ef-
fectively equating gender and sex from the beginning.18 The lines be-
tween the masculine and the feminine are rigid19 and correspond directly 
to the man/woman points on a gender binary.20 For instance, infant boys 
are dressed in stereotypically masculine clothes with stereotypically 
masculine colors, while infant girls wear feminine clothes bearing femi-
nine colors.21 Yet the practice of gendered accessorizing of young chil-
dren is a recent phenomenon; before the early twentieth century, all chil-
dren dressed alike.22 Separate, gendered clothing was a response to fears 
that allowing girls to be more active would deprive children of gender 
cues.23 Put another way, gendered dress was meant to teach children 
gender boundaries.24 And this worked; indicating gender in this way and 
others teaches children that there is an innate difference between males 
and females that translates into natural gender roles and identities.25 
From these cues come assumptions about sex and gender, specifi-
cally that innate differences exist, giving rise to justifiable gender roles.26 
Traditional gender roles place men in the workplace and women in the 
home, and there is no room for anyone existing outside the strict man–
woman gender binary.27 Fine posits that gender inequality has strong 
roots in the home and traditional ideas of what a successful heterosexual 
marriage looks like.28 Even in fairly egalitarian marriages in which both 
partners work, much of the housework and childcare falls on the woman 
partner.29 This pattern is sometimes referred to as a woman’s “second 
shift” in which she comes home from work only to do more work around 
                                                     
 17. Id. at 214–25. 
 18. Id. at 207–09. 
 19. Id. at 207. 
 20. Id. at 25. The “gender binary” is a term used to describe the idea that there are only two 
options for gender and they correspond directly with sex (i.e., all males are “men” and all females 
are “women,” and there is nothing in between). Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, 
http://www.glaad.org/transgender/trans101 (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
 21. FINE, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 207–09. In fact, gendered accessorizing took the infant-wear industry by storm once 
scientists learned that babies are extremely sensitive to their environments. Id. at 209. 
 24. Id. at 208–09. 
 25. Id. at 211. 
 26. Id. at 25. 
 27. See id. at 78–79. 
 28. Id. at 78. 
 29. Id. at 80. 
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the house.30 Some believe the dubious claim that the second shift is not a 
fairness issue because female hormones produce a pleasurable response 
to housework.31 Ignoring for now the scientific soundness of this idea,32 
other, more promising studies surmise that the second shift results from 
pressure on women to present themselves as good wives.33 As Veronica 
Tichenor notes, “[C]ultural expectations of what it means to be a good 
wife shape the domestic negotiations of unconventional earners and pro-
duce arrangements that privilege husbands and further burden wives.”34 
In addition, some men take home responsibilities less seriously in re-
sponse to gendered associations linking women with housework.35 
But why is this? Why does one assume gender roles are legitimate 
even if one knows they are social constructs? To begin to untangle this 
web, it is essential to separate sex and gender in terms of personal identi-
ty. 
1. Separating Sex and Gender Identity 
Sex and gender are distinct terms with separate meanings.36 Ac-
cording to the American Psychological Association, “sex” is assigned at 
birth according to phenotypical markers, like genitalia and chromosomal 
makeup.37 The categories of sex are biologically determined, meaning 
that a person can be male, female, or intersex, and they38 do not choose 
which they are.39 “Gender” is a social phenomenon, referring to “atti-
tudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a per-
son’s biological sex.”40 Words associated with gender include “mascu-
line,” “feminine,” “man,” and “woman.”41 Often, one is expected to be-
have in a manner that arbitrarily corresponds to their sex; that is, they are 
                                                     
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 81. 
 32. I will assess scientific data infra Part I.B. 
 33. FINE, supra note 2, at 82. 
 34. Veronica Tichenor, Maintaining Men’s Dominance: Negotiating Identity and Power When 
She Earns More, 53 SEX ROLES 191, 199 (2005). 
 35. See FINE, supra note 2, at 83. 
 36. Definition of Terms: Sex, Gender, Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) 
[hereinafter APA]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. In this paper, I use “them” and “they” as singular pronouns in an attempt at gender neutrali-
ty. “They” is an accepted construction of the singular first-person pronoun in the LGBTQIA com-
munity. Tips for Allies of Transgender People, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/transgender/allies 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 39. APA, supra note 36. 
 40. Id. 
 41. What Do We Mean by “Sex” and “Gender?,” WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/ 
gender/whatisgender/en/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
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expected to behave in a gender-normative manner.42 There can be some 
overlap between one’s sex and gender when a person identifies with the 
gender that traditionally corresponds to their sex.43 
However, not everyone fits neatly into the “male” or “female” box 
that adorns almost every administrative form they fill out.44 Simply put, 
these boxes cannot contain identity. Instead, some individuals adopt a 
loose definition of gender. As Hill and Mays have stated, “Your gender 
is where you feel the most comfortable, and it can grow and change just 
like the rest of you. It can include your understanding of your physical 
body, your understanding of your inner self, and the way you express 
that self to the world.”45 Using that definition, it is impossible to confine 
gender identity to two discrete checkboxes. As such, defining gender 
with only two options deprives some people of identifying themselves 
honestly. 
Further, gender is fluid; that is, self-concept is not static but malle-
able.46 This could be because the human mind is very susceptible to 
priming, or introducing gender into the context of a task, discussion, or 
other activity.47 For example, when a person is introduced to a task using 
gendered descriptors (such as, “on average, men score higher than wom-
en on math tests”), they subconsciously recall gender stereotypes, thus 
affecting their performance of the task.48 In the above example, study 
participants were primed with traditionally masculine or feminine words 
before rating their enjoyment of mathematics and literature.49 When 
primed with feminine words, women reported more enjoyment in litera-
ture (a traditionally feminine activity) than math (a traditionally mascu-
line activity).50 But when primed with masculine words, women reported 
equal enjoyment in both activities.51 Fine notes that this indicates gender 
differences appear not because of inherent differences between men and 
women but instead because of the salience of gender in society.52 
Another complicating factor is introduced by stereotype threat. Ste-
reotype threat is the “real-time threat of being judged and treated poorly 
                                                     
 42. See APA, supra note 36. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally MEL REIFF HILL & JAY MAYS, THE GENDER BOOK (2013). 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. FINE, supra note 2, at 7. 
 47. See id. at 2–3, 8–9. 
 48. Id. at 8–9. 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Id. at 9–10. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 25. 
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in settings where a negative stereotype about one’s group applies.”53 In 
fact, “[a] now-substantial literature shows that . . . changing the threat 
level of the context can have a tangible effect on ability.”54 For example, 
researchers at City University of New York posed difficult calculus ques-
tions to two groups of students enrolled in advanced math classes.55 Both 
groups received information packets about the exam, but only one group 
received instructions that stated that the test was meant to determine why 
some people are better at math than others.56 This presented an implicit 
threat to women students, who were most certainly aware of their per-
ceived inferiority in the subject.57 On average, women in this group 
scored lower than women in the non-threat group.58 Researchers con-
cluded that “the standard presentation of a test seemed to suppress wom-
en’s ability”; but when presented with the same test using gender-neutral 
terms, the women in the non-threat group outperformed the other group 
of women and both groups of men.59 Further, stereotype threat has been 
found to affect women when they are required to provide their sex or 
gender at the beginning of an exam; taking an exam as one of few wom-
en in a man-filled room; or taking an exam after watching videos depict-
ing women behaving in a ditzy and air-headed manner.60 Fine posits: 
[S]ubtle triggers for stereotype threat seem to be more harmful than 
blatant clues, which suggests the intriguing possibility that stereo-
type threat may be more of an issue for women now than it was 
decades ago, when people were more loose-lipped when it came to 
denigrating female ability.61 
That is, confusion or indecision about the presence or absence of a threat 
can affect cognitive function in a way perhaps not experienced when 
women were openly considered inferior.62 
Even without a threat present, deeply entrenched gender stereotypes 
can still prevail.63 Negative stereotypes can encourage behavior even 
                                                     
 53. Claude M. Steele, Steven J. Spencer & Joshua M. Aronson, Contending with Group Image: 
The Psychology of Stereotype Threat and Social Identity Threat, 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 379, 385 (2002). 
 54. FINE, supra note 2, at 30. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 31. 
 59. Id.; see also Catherine Good, Joshua Aronson & Jayne Ann Harder, Problems in the Pipe-
line: Stereotype Threat and Women’s Achievement in High-Level Math Courses, 29 J. APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 17, 25 (2008). 
 60. FINE, supra note 2, at 32. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 36. 
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when an explicit threat is not present, therefore masking a person’s abil-
ity and perpetuating the idea of innate gender differences.64 These beliefs 
allow stereotypes to self-perpetuate and continue to oppress those who 
do not adhere to traditional gender norms. Given this, it is dangerous to 
assume gendered qualities match an individual’s sex or apparent gender. 
2. Assuming Gender in Others 
Despite the complex processes involved in a person’s gender identi-
ty at any given moment, society remains rigidly gendered, and people are 
socialized to recognize gender cues.65 Sociologists have long known 
about the “in-group bias” phenomenon in which people feel strong kin-
ship with others sharing like traits, which could include race, gender, or 
even sports fandom.66 Often, these traits are arbitrary, but the kinship 
associated with them is very strong.67 For example, one study randomly 
assigned children in two preschool classrooms to the “red” group or the 
“blue” group.68 Over the next three weeks, all the children wore shirts 
corresponding to their group’s color.69 In one classroom, the groups were 
never mentioned; the children merely wore the shirts.70 But in the other 
classroom, teachers made the two groups relevant: they segregated chil-
dren by group, referred to them as “Reds” or “Blues,” and marked their 
cubbies with group colors.71 At the end of the study, researchers “found 
that being categorized as a Red or a Blue for just three weeks was 
enough to bias children’s views. The children, for example, preferred 
toys they were told were liked by their own group and expressed a great-
er desire to play with other [group members].”72 While children from 
both classrooms expressed some preferential behavior toward their group 
mates, the children in the classroom in which color was salient more 
strongly expressed their preferences.73 The moral of this story is that 
children self-socialize; they cobble together clues from their environment 
to explain how the world works.74 When it comes to gender, children 
                                                     
 64. See id. 
 65. See supra Part I.A. 
 66. Susan Krauss Whitbourne, Ph.D., In-groups, Out-groups, and the Psychology of Crowds, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 7, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fulfillment-any-
age/201012/in-groups-out-groups-and-the-psychology-crowds. 
 67. Id. 
 68. FINE, supra note 2, at 228. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 231–32. 
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quickly learn that masculinity and femininity directly mirror sex.75 Be-
cause children constantly search for characteristics that define them-
selves in relation to others,76 gender cues will shape their ideas of what 
sex means and reinforce its importance.77 
Generalizations about gender rely on the assumption that gender is 
inextricably linked to sex: men behave aggressively, thereby fueling 
masculinity, while women behave docilely, exhibiting femininity.78 But 
are they linked? Some scholars claim that men and women are neurolog-
ically different, tying gender to sex in some ways; myriad neurological 
studies claim to have found biological bases for sex differences.79 Where 
do these studies fit with sociological data regarding gender as a social 
construct? 
B. Neurological Gender? Debunking “Neurofallacies” and Innate Dif-
ference 
Fine examined numerous neuroscientific and sociological studies to 
determine whether they were methodologically sound and based in fact.80 
She ultimately concluded that the studies, on the whole, erroneously as-
sumed that sex differences created gender differences.81 To describe 
these findings, she coined the term “neurosexism,” a logical fallacy in 
which one concludes sex differences create immutable gender differ-
ences by assuming that gender differences are the result of sex differ-
ences.82 In her broad search, Fine found no reliable evidence to support 
the idea that there are innate male and female behaviors.83 In other 
words, she found no evidence to suggest gender differences are “hard-
wired.” 
Yet there is no consensus on this issue. One of the most pervasive 
theories supporting hardwired gender differences involves fetal testos-
terone levels.84 All fetuses start out with “the same unisex primordial 
                                                     
 75. See id. at 210–11. 
 76. Id. at 212 (“In fact, young children are so eager to carve up the world into what is female 
and what is male that [researchers] have reported finding it difficult to create stimuli for their studies 
that children see as gender neutral . . . .”). 
 77. Id. at 212–13. 
 78. See generally id. 
 79. See id. at xvi (“[T]he underlying message is the same. Male and female brains are different 
in ways that matter.”). 
 80. See generally id. 
 81. See id. at 231–39. 
 82. See id. at 154 (categorizing neurosexism as a “subspecialty within the larger discipline of 
neurononsense”). 
 83. Id. at 231–39. 
 84. Id. at 99–101; see also Simon Baron-Cohen, It’s Not Sexist to Accept That Biology Affects 
Behaviour, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2010, 10:06 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2010/may/03/biology-sexist-gender-stereotypes. 
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gonads,” and at the sixth week of gestation, either a gene on the Y chro-
mosome activates “maleness” or the absence of the Y chromosome al-
lows for the development of “femaleness.”85 In theory, these testosterone 
surges create connections in the male brain that are different than those 
created by the lack of testosterone in the female brain.86 Male connec-
tions mean that men are better at systematizing, and the different, female 
connections give women superior emotional intelligence.87 Conversely, 
the existence of sex-specific connections means that men lack empathy 
and women lack mathematical acuity.88 
However, major problems with scientific soundness tarnish the bold 
generalizations drawn from fetal testosterone experiments. Most im-
portantly, fetal testosterone levels are very difficult to test.89 Fetal blood 
is very rarely sampled, meaning that researchers measure the testosterone 
level in either the mother’s blood or the surrounding amniotic fluid.90 As 
such, without further technological advancement, one cannot know how 
testosterone affects the fetal brain.91 
Further, “[b]ehavioral differences must be accompanied by neural 
differences, so the observation of a neural sex difference on its own tells 
us little to nothing about how the difference developed.”92 In other 
words, neurological differences before birth do not explain observed 
gendered behavior after birth. “Hence, the existence of a neural sex dif-
ference, even one that relates to a behavior known to be influenced by 
early [fetal hormone] exposure, does not prove that the hormone expo-
sure caused the neural difference.”93 While fetal hormone exposure could 
play a role in sexual and possibly behavioral development, it should not 
be considered ultimately determinative of sex differential behavior.94 
Another theory of innate sex difference revolves around brain 
scans. Studies examining brain structure, areas of activation under func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and brain interconnectivity 
                                                     
 85. FINE, supra note 2, at 100; Melissa Hines, Gender Development and the Human Brain, 34 
ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 69, 71 (2011), available at http://facweb.northseattle.edu/avoorhies/ 
Gender/Readings/Development/Gender%20development%20and%20the%20human%20brain.pdf. 
 86. FINE, supra note 2, at 99 (quoting LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2007)). 
 87. See id. at xix; see also Baron-Cohen, supra note 84. 
 88. See FINE, supra note 2, at 100 (noting Simon Baron-Cohen’s remark and wondering, 
“[W]hy, in over 100 years of the existence of the Fields Medal, maths’ [equivalent of the] Nobel 
Prize, have none of the winners ever been a woman?”). Baron-Cohen is a strong proponent of the 
fetal testosterone theory of sex difference and believes that men are inherently more mathematically 
competent than women. Id. 
 89. See id. at 107–08. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 108. 
 92. Hines, supra note 85, at 78. 
 93. Id. at 79. 
 94. Id. at 80. 
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have concluded that not only are there inherent structural differences in 
male and female brains but also that such differences cause distinct be-
havior.95 For example, one study concluded that women are more intui-
tive than men because they have a larger corpus callosum, a neural struc-
ture that connects both hemispheres of the brain.96 Additionally, one au-
thor claimed that when women are told that their romantic partner is be-
ing electrically shocked, “the same pain areas [of the women’s] brains 
that had activated when they themselves were shocked lit up when they 
learned [others] were being strongly shocked.”97 In the same paper, the 
author states that such results have never been replicated in male sub-
jects, strongly suggesting that these neuroimaging studies revealed innate 
sex differences that translated into gendered behavioral differences.98 
However, neuroimaging paints an incomplete picture of brain activ-
ity and behavior. Because neuroscience (and, with it, neuroimaging) is 
still relatively new,99 it cannot possibly connect neurological activity 
with behavior in a meaningful way: 
The [fMRI] scanners, they say, excel at measuring certain types of 
brain activity, but are also effectively blind when it comes to the de-
tection of more subtle aspects of cognition. As a result, the pictures 
that seem so precise are often deeply skewed snapshots of mental 
activity. Furthermore, one of the most common uses of brain scan-
ners—taking a complex psychological phenomenon and pinning it 
to a particular bit of cortex—is now being criticized as a potentially 
serious oversimplification of how the brain works. These critics 
stress the interconnectivity of the brain, noting that virtually every 
thought and feeling emerges from the crosstalk of different areas 
spread across the cortex. If fMRI is a window into the soul, these 
scientists say, then the glass is very, very dirty.100 
Further, by drawing such strong conclusions from brain scans, research-
ers ignore the possibility that the neurological activity pictured on the 
scan is spurious rather than psychologically driven.101 Fine remarks that 
these studies are “unwittingly projecting assumptions about gender onto 
the vast unknown that is the brain.”102 Simply put, “neither structural nor 
                                                     
 95. FINE, supra note 2, at 142–50, 155–57. 
 96. Id. at 157 (noting conclusions drawn by MICHAEL GURIAN & BARBARA ANNIS, 
LEADERSHIP AND THE SEXES: USING GENDER SCIENCE TO CREATE SUCCESS IN BUSINESS (2008)). 
 97. LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 163 (2007). 
 98. Id. 
 99. FINE, supra note 2, at 154. 
 100. Jonah Lehrer, Picturing Our Thoughts, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2008), 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/08/17/picturing_our_thoughts/?page=full. 
 101. FINE, supra note 2, at 150. 
 102. Id. 
1062 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:1051 
functional imaging can currently tell us much about differences between 
male and female minds.”103 
Overall, much room for doubt exists in these studies because a large 
number of unknown variables remain.104 Simplistic conclusions drawn in 
spite of unknown factors cannot describe the innate abilities and talents 
of half the world’s population. Neuroscience is complicated, and the hu-
man brain cannot be reduced to “male” or “female.” To do so would not 
only underplay the complexity of the human brain but also discount en-
tirely environmental and genetic influences on human behavior. Further, 
scientific studies test correlational hypotheses to produce theories. Short 
of a concrete understanding of each link in the chain between hormonal 
exposure and behavioral expression, one cannot know for sure if inherent 
sex differences exist to the point that they give rise to gender, much less 
affect behavior. As such, neurological sex differences are less hardwired 
than these studies make them seem, making them unsuitable criteria for a 
hiring decision. 
C. Gender Bias in the Employment Context 
As sex and gender workplace discrimination becomes less overt, a 
substantial body of research reveals a less conspicuous form of discrimi-
nation, commonly referred to as second-generation workplace discrimi-
nation.105 Second-generation workplace discrimination describes “pat-
terns of interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, 
exclude nondominant groups.”106 Further, “[t]hese interactions influence 
workplace conditions, access, and opportunities for advancement over 
time, and thus constitute the structure for inclusion or exclusion.”107 For 
example, a discriminating coworker might undermine a woman’s compe-
tence at work, comment on her appearance at work, or refuse to work 
with her if a man is available for the same task.108 Often, second-
generation workplace discrimination takes place within legal bounda-
ries.109 
Like its predecessor in sexist workplace practices, second-
generation workplace discrimination is still overt. In this Note, I focus on 
something subtler: discrimination born from subconscious bias. Subcon-
                                                     
 103. Id. at 154. 
 104. See id. at 105. 
 105. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
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scious bias is the result of deeply entrenched ideas about how people of a 
certain group behave, think, or should behave or think.110 It is not neces-
sarily a conscious effort to discriminate or act upon a prejudice; often-
times, subconscious bias guides one’s choices in a subtle, perhaps unno-
ticeable way.111 For example, studies have shown that when presented 
with identical résumés, the only difference being the name at the top, 
people find the man candidate more qualified and competent than the 
woman candidate.112 In one study, three quarters of participants (who 
were psychologists themselves) thought the man candidate hirable, while 
less than half considered the woman candidate hirable.113 
More specifically, assumptions that sex differences give rise to 
gendered behavior can hurt women’s chances of being hired: 
[B]oth the descriptive (“women are gentle”) and the prescriptive 
(“women should be gentle”) elements of gender stereotypes create a 
problem for ambitious women. Without any intention of bias, once 
we have categorized someone as male or female, activated gender 
stereotypes can then color our perception. When the qualifications 
for the job include stereotypically male qualities, this will serve to 
disadvantage women . . . .114 
In another study, researchers presented undergraduates with a job de-
scription and a résumé, and they asked the students to determine whether 
the candidate was a good fit for the position.115 The job descriptions and 
résumés were identical for every participant with the exception of the job 
title and the name.116 Some job descriptions were listed as “executive 
chief of staff,” while others were listed as “executive secretary,” and ré-
sumés were labeled with either a traditionally male or female name.117 
The results of the study “revealed a favoring of, and greater confidence 
in, female secretaries and male chiefs of staff.”118 
These findings are not promising. While the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) urges employers to not inquire about 
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 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 55. 
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sex or race during the job application process, it does not have a rule ex-
pressly forbidding such questions.119 In an effort to close this loophole, 
some scholars propose regimes that impose an anonymous hiring pro-
cess.120 While the ideas vary in detail, the basic concept is the same: re-
move all markers of identity from the job application process so that em-
ployers can make hiring decisions based on merits rather than overt or 
entrenched prejudices.121 In the context of gender, such a scheme might 
look something like this: on hiring documents, remove names and, of 
course, the “M” and “F” checkboxes; neutralize as many gender-specific 
terms as possible; and remove externalities that might indirectly reveal 
gender. While difficulties in neutralizing some résumé items stand in the 
way of total anonymization,122 they should not preclude action to partial-
ly anonymize. No problem is totally solvable; every law is an attempt to 
mitigate a problem, and if legislators abandoned mitigating efforts, they 
would have nothing to do. Generally speaking, the law is meant to draw 
lines and attempt to reach solutions rather than solve problems complete-
ly. 
Importantly, proponents of gender identification parallel proponents 
of racial segregation. Gender classification is a modern analog of the 
“separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.123 In the seminal 
case on post-Civil War race relations, the Court declared that if racial 
minorities felt denigrated by separation, it was only because they chose 
to feel denigrated.124 This attitude was very much in line with traditional 
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American values of individuality and self-sufficiency,125 but it ignored 
the reality that the playing field was uneven. In his commencement ad-
dress to Howard University in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson summed 
up this concept: “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hob-
bled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race 
and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly 
believe that you have been completely fair.”126 Ignoring his gendered 
phrasing, the point remains the same: social and institutional inequalities 
prevent equal access to economic activity. Just as this attitude affected 
(and continues to affect) minorities in the pre-civil rights era, it affects 
women and gender minorities today. Equality has not been realized, and 
to say otherwise is to ignore the vast body of research supporting the idea 
that people believe that men and women are inherently different (though 
they cannot say why) and the fact that this erroneous belief has serious 
repercussions in the real world.127 Despite these realities, current law 
does not sufficiently address the problem of subconscious gender bias. 
II. CURRENT LAW FAILS TO PROTECT AGAINST SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS 
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits denying or revoking employment primarily on the basis of race, 
sex, or other descriptors.128 Specifically, § 2000e-2(a)(2) makes it illegal 
for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.”129 Because employers can request gender 
or gendered information on applications,130 they have the opportunity to 
form sex- or gender-based opinions on applicants regardless of the appli-
cants’ qualifications. Subconscious gender bias toward job applicants 
allows (and, arguably, effectively guarantees) that employers will dis-
criminate against applicants based on sex or gender, thus violating the 
spirit of Title VII.131 In order to sue for gender-based hiring discrimina-
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tion, women can file either a disparate impact claim or a disparate treat-
ment claim.132 Under Title VII, gender minorities are not a protected 
group.133 
To win a disparate impact employment claim under Title VII, one 
must satisfy the test articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.134 In 
Griggs, a power company attached educational requirements to        
higher-paying, traditionally white jobs.135 Thirteen African-American 
workers sued under Title VII, and the Court held that, while the educa-
tional requirements were facially neutral, they disparately impacted peo-
ple of color and thus were not allowable under Title VII.136 The Court 
said that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring 
job capability.”137 In short, to determine that a hiring policy or scheme is 
impermissible, the court must find that it disparately impacts a group 
protected by Title VII.138 
The Court expanded the Griggs test in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio.139 In Wards Cove, a group of workers in unskilled jobs filed a 
Title VII complaint against a cannery claiming that its hiring practices 
for skilled positions favored white applicants.140 The Court articulated 
three steps a plaintiff must satisfy to win such a claim. First, a plaintiff 
must make a prima facie showing that a specific employment practice 
disparately impacts a protected group.141 If the plaintiff succeeds, they 
move to step two, in which the burden shifts to the employer to justify 
the practice or show that the practice does not cause a disparate im-
pact.142 If the employer cannot prove that legitimate business ends justify 
the practice, they will lose the case.143 Should the employer meet this 
burden, the analysis moves into step three. Here, the plaintiff must show 
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“the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same business 
ends, with less [disparate] impact” in order to secure a ruling in their fa-
vor. 144 In Wards Cove, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not establish 
a prima facie case of hiring discrimination; as such, it returned a ruling 
for the employer.145 
In general, the Court has been hesitant to lower the bar for discrim-
ination claims.146 For example, the Court in Wards Cove worried that if a 
plaintiff did not have to show that specific practices led to discrimina-
tion, they would be able to raise judicially inefficient claims over inno-
cent practices.147 Additionally, the Court has expressed concern about 
placing too heavy a burden on employers. To mitigate this, when evalu-
ating alternate employment practices (step three of the analysis), the 
Court prescribed consideration of “[f]actors such as the cost or other 
burdens of proposed alternative selection devices . . . in determining 
whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in 
serving the employer’s legitimate business goals.”148 
Alternatively, a plaintiff could file a disparate treatment claim. The 
Court laid out the three-step test for disparate treatment in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.149 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination, which includes proof of the employer’s dis-
criminatory intent.150 For example, a prima facie case could be made by 
showing that: the plaintiff was a member of a protected group; the plain-
tiff applied for a job and was qualified; the plaintiff was subsequently 
rejected; and the position remained open after the rejection.151 Should the 
plaintiff succeed, they move to step two, in which the burden of proof 
shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate reasons for the allegedly 
discriminatory conduct.152 If the employer succeeds in articulating a rea-
son for the discriminatory conduct, the court moves to step three of the 
analysis. In step three, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s rea-
sons for the discriminatory conduct are mere pretext.153 That is, the plain-
tiff can still win her claim if she can successfully show that the employer 
                                                     
 144. Id. at 658. 
 145. Id. at 657. 
 146. See, e.g., id. at 657; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988). 
 147. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. 
 148. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. 
 149. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). 
 150. Id. at 802; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 151. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 152. Id. Later case law provides a simpler description: “[T]he only issue to be decided at that 
point is whether the plaintiffs have actually proved discrimination.” Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 
385, 398 (1986). 
 153. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
1068 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:1051 
acted out of prejudice rather than the reason the employer gave for the 
discriminatory conduct.154 
However, disparate treatment claims are difficult to win. The bur-
den on employers is light; they must only “produce evidence that 
‘raise[s] a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the employer] discriminat-
ed.’”155 Further, “case law reveals a willingness on the part of judges to 
accept a benign explanation of gender segregation rooted in the voluntary 
choices of women and men rather than conclude that segregation is a 
product of discriminatory actions by the employer.”156 For example, in 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the EEOC claimed that Sears routinely 
preferred men applicants over women applicants for commissioned jobs, 
giving lower-paying, noncommissioned jobs to women instead.157 In a 
lengthy opinion, the Seventh Circuit articulated why it believed that 
women’s job preferences, not discrimination, were to blame for the gen-
der disparity in commissioned jobs.158 For one, the court agreed with the 
district court that women were generally less interested in commissioned 
jobs because noncommissioned jobs were more comfortable: “Noncom-
mission selling . . . was associated with more social contact and friend-
ship, less pressure and less risk.”159 In other words, assumptions about 
inherent sex differences, rather than factual data, won the day. 
As Sears illustrates, finders of fact make decisions in a cultural con-
text. Attitudes about sex difference or simply the existence of sexism 
color the decision-making process. If one believes that women are pre-
disposed to timidity in the face of conflict or that women genuinely oc-
cupy an equal playing field to men, one is more inclined to believe a pat-
tern of discrimination is justified.160 Choice is, after all, an American 
value. How American would it be to find that an employer discriminated 
on the basis of sex when, in truth, men are just better at the job? A large 
part of American capitalism is allowing employers the economic free-
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dom to choose the best people for the job, so it is difficult to reconcile 
the value of choice with the need for social equality. As one scholar 
notes, 
[A] strong conception of employee choice or agency constrains the 
scope of employer liability under both disparate impact and dispar-
ate treatment models of discrimination and, in turn, limits the effec-
tiveness of antidiscrimination law in dismantling workplace segre-
gation. Relying on the rhetoric of choice, courts regard segregated 
employment patterns as a product of individual preference rather 
than illegal discrimination.161 
Due largely to cultural factors and the difficulty of succeeding in a dis-
crimination claim, the current state of the law makes it very difficult, if 
not impossible, to bring a successful subconscious bias claim. 
Even so, subconscious gender bias has significant economic effects; 
like cisgender men, women and gender minorities participate in the na-
tional and global economy.162 Discrimination against these groups both 
directly and indirectly prevents full economic participation in myriad 
ways. First, sex and gender discrimination in hiring decisions can prevent 
qualified women from being hired at all.163 When employers face equally 
qualified candidates, they very likely might choose a man over a woman 
because of subconscious beliefs about gender roles.164 Even if men appli-
cants would have only a slight advantage over women applicants, they 
would still occupy a higher playing field, perpetuating an imbalance in 
the workforce. Until the scales are balanced, sex and gender should not 
play any role in the hiring decision. 
Second, gender discrimination prevents women’s professional ad-
vancement.165 This is not just a problem of overt discrimination; subcon-
scious bias allows employers (regardless of gender) to pass over quali-
fied women candidates in favor of equally or less-qualified men candi-
dates.166 For example, only 4.8% of Fortune 500 companies have women 
CEOs.167 Additionally, “[s]tudies show that business leaders tend to bet-
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ter prepare men for top jobs than women and that women are dispropor-
tionately assigned to oversee change within businesses—jobs that pose 
greater risk of failure.”168 Relatedly, a recent article points out that our 
culture equates professional power with men. The article revealed that a 
Google search for “CEO” returns dozens of pictures of men and a picture 
of CEO Barbie (originally a joke photo from The Onion)169 before it 
showed any actual women.170 This example reveals a bias against women 
as powerful leaders or decision-makers. Conscious or not, these beliefs 
about women’s roles and abilities prevent women from advancing in 
their careers. 
Third, gender discrimination results in unequal pay for women. 
Women are routinely paid less than men for the same work simply be-
cause of their sex or perceived gender.171 Again, discrimination is not 
always overt; assumptions about gender can inform one’s opinion of an 
employee’s job performance.172 To illustrate, some transgender men have 
experienced different treatment at the office before and after transition.173 
One man was told by a colleague that his research was much more im-
pressive than his “sister’s” when in fact it was the same person conduct-
ing the research.174 This heightened approval for nothing more than a 
change in gender presentation suggests how easily and routinely employ-
ers and coworkers devalue women’s professional contributions, making 
it easier to deny them equal pay for the same work. 
Finally, gender discrimination fuels unequal economic interactions 
between market participants. For example, a car dealer might be more 
willing to bargain with a man than a woman; a manufacturer might prefer 
to sell to companies headed by men; or a contractor might prefer to deal 
with a husband instead of his wife. While the sleazy, sexist car salesman 
undeniably elicits societal disapproval, he would find himself more wide-
ly accepted if his sexist decisions were unconscious. The subtly sexist 
salesman might approach his job with the intention to treat all customers 
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equally; however, deeply entrenched stereotypes surrounding, for exam-
ple, patterns of speech common to women, feminine dress, or weight can 
subconsciously inform his retail approach.175 In this scenario and many 
others, subconscious bias drives the behavior of economic participants, 
resulting in tangible economic consequences. 
Despite these serious economic effects, subconscious bias claims 
remain difficult to raise successfully. As such, Congress must address the 
demonstrable impact of subconscious gender bias by creating more pro-
tection than Title VII jurisprudence currently offers. I believe a law pro-
hibiting sex and gender markers on job application materials would elim-
inate some effects of subconscious gender bias at the hiring stage and 
provide more adequate legal protection for women and gender minorities 
in the workplace. 
III. REMOVING SEX AND GENDER MARKERS TO COMBAT SUBCONSCIOUS 
BIAS 
As stated in Part II, researchers have addressed Title VII’s inade-
quacy in combating employment discrimination in general and in the 
context of subconscious bias.176 One author proposed a voluntary regula-
tory scheme that would anonymize the entire job application process (in-
cluding interviews).177 He noted that anything more stringent than a vol-
untary program would be politically infeasible, though he provided no 
explanation for this assertion.178 However, voluntary regulatory schemes 
lack the power to seriously address subconscious gender bias.179 The au-
thor claims employers would readily adopt a voluntary regulatory 
scheme because they could use it to defend against discrimination 
claims.180 However, this argument relies on the idea that discrimination 
suits pose a real problem for employers. This is not always the case. Of 
the 303,820 suits filed in federal court in 2014, only 12,330 regarded 
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employment practices.181 Further, the majority of these suits were termi-
nated: 260,269 were terminated before judgment and 176,359 were ter-
minated before the pretrial phase.182 In fact, only 4.2% of employment 
actions (and 1.2% of all actions) survived until trial.183 While discrimina-
tion suits are filed, they, like all lawsuits, are costly. The employer-
incentive argument ignores the reality that litigation is the exception, not 
the rule, for workplace discrimination.184 
Federal legislation is necessary to combat subconscious gender bias 
because employers will not adopt mitigating measures voluntarily, de-
spite arguments to the contrary. The cost of anonymizing job application 
materials or other administrative burdens to the employer could outweigh 
the benefits of the affirmative defense provided by the program. Some 
employers might claim that such legislation impedes their right to con-
tract by interfering with their hiring decisions. Proponents of laissez-faire 
economics would probably deride the law as an attempt to force the in-
visible hand of the market, claiming that adverse consequences or eco-
nomic inefficiencies would result from it. Others might say such legisla-
tion is unnecessary, citing either a perceived social sex and gender bal-
ance or inherent differences between sexes. However, no such balance 
exists, and only shaky scientific evidence supports the idea that relevant 
sex differences do exist.185 Any inconveniences employers might face 
pale in comparison to the economic inequalities women and gender mi-
norities face every day. Administrative burdens do not justify preventing 
women and gender minorities from achieving equality, and generalized 
libertarian arguments to the contrary fail to consider evidence that a free 
market operates in favor of privileged groups.186 
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trines work in favor of privileged groups, which can have economic consequences). Leibler de-
scribes how the lack of legal protection for online harassment can injure women’s job prospects. Id. 
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Further, state or local legislation will not adequately address the 
problem of subconscious bias. For anonymization procedures to work, 
legislation must target businesses in the aggregate. If only some jurisdic-
tions impose such laws, businesses could plausibly relocate to jurisdic-
tions without anonymization laws. Businesses spread across multiple 
jurisdictions would face difficulty implementing these measures and 
could institute hiring freezes or close certain branches to avoid compli-
ance. Additionally, subconscious bias affects women and gender minori-
ties everywhere. Without a consistent scheme across jurisdictions, wom-
en and gender minorities who transfer between or seek employment in 
other jurisdictions would encounter difficulties in different economic 
climates. Only federal legislation will provide everyone protection from 
demonstrable economic injustice. 
I propose a federal statute prohibiting sex or gender markers on job 
applications. The legislation is drawn narrowly to apply only in the pre-
interview phase of the job application process. A possible draft follows: 
PURPOSE: To aid in the prevention of wage, job placement, and 
workplace discrimination based on conscious or subconscious sex 
or gender bias by forbidding employers from requesting or access-
ing sex or gender identification in or on any and all parts of the pre-
interview phase of the job application process. 
Section 1. Definitions for the purposes of this statute: 
(a) The term “gender” refers to attitudes, feelings, and behaviors 
that a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex.187 
(b) The term “gender identity” refers to how one expresses oneself 
in relation to attitudes, feelings, or beliefs about gender. 
(c) The term “sex” refers to a person’s chromosomal makeup as it 
exists on the twenty-third pair of chromosomes.188 
(d) “Markers of sex and/or gender” include, but are not limited to: 
checkboxes marking sex; names insofar as gender is reasonably and 
readily clear; gendered nouns or pronouns; and gendered job titles 
or job descriptions. 
(e) “Employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day 
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preced-
ing calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term 
does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned 
by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any de-
                                                     
 187. Per APA definition. See APA, supra note 36. 
 188. The twenty-third pair of chromosomes determines sex. How Many Chromosomes Do 
People Have?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/basics/howmany 
chromosomes (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
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partment or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to 
procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of 
Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a la-
bor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 
501(c) of Title 26.189 
(f) The term “person seeking employment” refers to any individual 
seeking paid work, full- or part-time. 
(g) The “job application process” is the process by which an indi-
vidual seeking employment conveys a firm intention to seek em-
ployment with an employer. 
(h) The “preinterview stage” of the job application process refers to 
any paper or online application materials used for a particular em-
ployer. This includes, but is not limited to: résumés, application 
forms, cover letters, and letters of recommendation. Background 
checks and like searches must be completed through a separate pro-
cess that does not link candidates to application materials by name, 
number, or other such markers. 
Section 2. No employer or agent thereof shall request, require, or 
otherwise inquire into the gender identity or sex of any person seek-
ing employment. Additionally, employers and agents thereof must 
screen job applicants in a way that eliminates sex, gender, and 
markers of sex and/or gender. Employers or agents thereof review-
ing applications must not see or otherwise access said applications 
before sex, gender, or markers of sex and/or gender are removed. 
These rules apply only during the preinterview stage of the job ap-
plication process. 
Section 3. Redress. Any person whose sex or gender identity has 
been requested either directly or indirectly by an employer or agent 
thereof or whose employer or agent thereof saw or had access to the 
person’s application materials before sex, gender, or markers of sex 
and/or gender were removed may seek compensatory and punitive 
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The burden is on the em-
ployer to show by clear and convincing evidence that the request or 
access was in error and wholly without intent to discriminate and 
that the hiring decision was not affected by sex or gender bias. The 
employer must also show that its system of anonymization removes 
sex, gender, and markers of sex and/or gender as thoroughly as rea-
sonably possible. 
This legislation is attractive for several reasons. First, this statute al-
lows employers leeway to create schemes to fit their needs. Every busi-
ness operates differently, and too specific a regulation would prove diffi-
                                                     
 189. The definition of “employer” uses the same wording as the definition for “employer” in 
the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
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cult to implement in practice. Open-ended language with a clear purpose 
will show employers the goal line and enable them to tailor a system to 
get there. For example, a midsized law firm might use a computer pro-
gram to tag incoming application materials and replace names with ini-
tials and gender identifiers with either a gender-neutral term or a space. 
For contacting references, employers could either communicate with ref-
erences in writing190 or channel all contact through a third party that 
would remove gender markers and report to those making the hiring de-
cision. The computer system will have stored the name and gender mark-
ers, allowing the system to reinsert them once employers have chosen 
candidates to interview. Such a program would at once block subcon-
scious gender bias and allow candidates to discuss their accomplishments 
in full at the interview stage. This system would require fine-tuning to 
address specific concerns of the company in question; however, deter-
mining such details is outside the purview of Congress.191 
Additionally, anonymization systems created by this legislation 
would allow affirmative action policies to continue. As long as employ-
ers remove applicants’ gender markers and save them separately, em-
ployers could later use the markers to additionally aid in their hiring de-
cision. If a woman is chosen from her paper application and is denied an 
interview once the markers have been reinserted, she would have a valid 
claim under Title VII.192 As such, this legislation leaves room for both 
affirmative action policies and Title VII remedies should employers dis-
criminate based on reinserted gender markers. 
Second, this statute shows strong government support for gender 
equality. Congressional hearings detailing the problems of subconscious 
bias would lay the basis for the statute’s purpose, giving courts guidance 
in interpreting future cases under the law. Such hearings should include 
extensive evidence of the effects of subconscious gender bias and argu-
ments that current anti-discrimination law does not adequately curb em-
ployer bias. Further, congressional action on this issue would be symbol-
ic, showing initiative to eliminate barriers to women and gender minori-
ties in the workplace. The majority of Americans believe in gender 
                                                     
 190. This was suggested in Hausman, supra note 120, at 1360. 
 191. Hausman suggests EEOC guidelines that completely anonymize the hiring process from 
start to finish. Under his system, employers would not be allowed to interview candidates to preserve 
anonymity. Even though my proposal requires anonymization only in the preinterview stage, his 
draft guidelines could serve to inspire employers or jurisdictions when instating their own programs. 
See id. at 1360–61. 
 192. See EEOC. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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equality,193 so this would be an important step for those who believe the 
government can do more to promote it. 
Third, the legislation changes the game for the plaintiff by placing 
the burden of proof on the employer. In both disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment discrimination suits, the burden begins and ends on the 
plaintiff.194 While the burden temporarily shifts to the employer to prove 
the allegedly discriminatory act was for a legitimate business reason, it 
ultimately rests on the plaintiff to prove either an effective alternative 
employment method or discriminatory intent, both difficult, high bars to 
pass.195 Under current law, the employer’s burden is very light; employ-
ers can easily propose a business interest to obfuscate discriminatory in-
tent.196 A plaintiff bears an especially heavy burden when claiming sub-
conscious bias, as discriminatory intent may not be obvious. This legisla-
tion considers both plaintiffs and employers by clearly setting out pro-
scribed behavior and providing an easier-to-obtain remedy for plaintiffs. 
While the plaintiff would have to state a valid claim upfront,197 violation 
of the law would be clear: employers either screen for gender or they do 
not. However, this proposal does not target gendered questions during 
interviews; while such questions undeniably discriminate, they are be-
yond the scope of this Note. 
Finally, this statute would make significant strides toward gender 
equality. While this legislation alone will not abolish the effects of sub-
conscious gender bias in the workplace, it would remove one filter of 
bias from the job application process. Further, it would alert employers 
that such bias exists, hopefully incentivizing them to reflect upon their 
biases during later stages in the application process. 
While it will undeniably experience political scrutiny, my proposal 
is feasible; because legislation like this regulates an economic activity, 
Congress can act under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause, 
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, provides that Congress is empowered 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”198 Jurisprudence in this area allows 
                                                     
 193. Gender Equality Universally Embraced, but Inequalities Acknowledged, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (July 1, 2010), http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/01/gender-equality/. 
 194. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 195. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658, 660; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 196. See supra Part II. 
 197. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Congress much discretion to regulate as it sees fit in matters affecting 
interstate commerce.199  
The Court has indicated that remedying unequal economic partici-
pation is a sufficient reason to regulate.200 In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, the Court held that hotels could not use race to discrimi-
nate against customers, finding that such a policy affects out-of-state 
travelers, thus impacting the economy and precluding full economic par-
ticipation of racial minorities.201 By overturning this policy under the 
Civil Rights Act, the Court regulated hotels in the aggregate rather than 
forcing one hotel to change its policy.202 Therefore, the Court reasoned, 
all hotels are regulated equally.203 Similarly, my proposal would regulate 
all businesses equally under the umbrella of the Commerce Clause. Like 
in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the unequal economic participation of women 
and gender minorities demonstrably affects interstate commerce. A case-
by-case approach to workplace discrimination would not have the signif-
icant impact of aggregate regulation. Unlike litigation, legislation under 
the Commerce Clause has the potential to meaningfully remedy sex- and 
gender-based economic imbalance.  
CONCLUSION 
Subconscious bias is just as dangerous as overt discrimination and 
can have detrimental, life-changing effects. Like in Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, public disclosure of sex and gender in the employment context pre-
vents equal economic participation by women and gender minorities. 
Consciously or not, gender stereotypes color the perception of an indi-
vidual;204 therefore, checking the “F” box effectively guarantees one’s 
heightened scrutiny in the marketplace. Requiring one to distinguish their 
sex or gender essentially codifies traditional gender roles. Without a law 
prohibiting sex and gender markers on job applications, the government 
essentially recognizes the idea that there are inherent, relevant differ-
ences between sexes, perpetuating the idea that such differences legiti-
mize discrimination on some level. 
                                                     
 199. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (holding the federal 
government can regulate local intersections because they are channels of interstate commerce); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (stating that a segregated restaurant that serves 
only local customers is not exempt from the Civil Rights Act because the restaurant purchases food 
from out of state); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding Congress can regulate 
personal production of wheat crops because all personal producers affect interstate commerce in the 
aggregate). 
 200. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964). 
 201. Id. at 258. 
 202. Id. at 260. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra Part I. 
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When people believe that there are inherent differences between 
sexes, they lay the groundwork for discriminatory laws and policies. For 
example, if males and females really do differ in mathematical ability, it 
suddenly makes sense to pay male engineers more than female engineers. 
After all, Americans value meritorious achievement; is this not recogni-
tion of merit? Politicians tout this kind of thinking all the time, though it 
is often more subtle.205 Opposing equal pay laws is not discriminatory, 
according to these politicians and pundits; instead, it protects the free-
dom to contract.206 Such a philosophy feels eerily similar to Lochner-era 
Supreme Court decisions, which have since been overturned.207 If lais-
sez-faire attitudes unfairly tip the scales in favor of privileged groups in 
business settings, why support policies promoting these attitudes? Wom-
en and gender minorities deserve equal economic participation, and this 
legislation attempts to provide it. One should not have to play the violin 
to receive equal consideration. 
 
                                                     
 205. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Senate Republicans Reject Equal Pay Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 
9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-republicans-reject-equal-pay-bill/2014/ 
04/09/ce011342-c003-11e3-b574-f8748871856a_story.html (“[Republicans] say that the bill is un-
necessary because discrimination based on gender is already illegal.”). 
 206. Id. (“‘At a time when the Obama economy is already hurting women so much, this legis-
lation would double down on job loss—all while lining the pockets of trial lawyers,’ Senate Minority 
Leader Mitch McConnell (Ky.) said on the Senate floor before the vote.”). 
 207. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), ushered in a libertarian, laissez-faire era in the 
Court. At that time, the Court promoted a philosophy of “free business,” which effectively protected 
financial elites and other privileged classes rather than preserving an ideal marketplace. The Court 
has since discredited the Lochner rule. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 
(1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a 
wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that 
peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome condi-
tions of work and freedom from oppression.”). 
